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Abstract 
In a bid to understand how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can aid in 
promoting financial stability, economists have recently called the definition of core deposits into 
question. Deposit insurance is extended to core deposits because they represent the stable 
funding base that the banking system relies on for liquidity. The criteria used by the FDIC to 
determine whether a funding source is insurable are not consistent with any objective criteria 
available to define core deposits. Herein I assess current FDIC criteria and whether the kinds of 
deposits currently insured are good candidates for coverage. I find brokered deposits to be 
particularly ill-suited to insurance. The FDIC could further promote banking-system stability 
while simultaneously reducing potential costs by ending its extension of insurance to brokered 
deposits. 
 






The dollars in our wallets are maintained by the Federal Reserve, and as the sign on the door to 
every Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured depository institution (IDI) reminds 
us, our “deposits are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.”1 For 
most purposes, currency in circulation is a perfect substitute for funds deposited in an IDI to the 
extent that both serve as the final means of settlement for debt obligations. How perfect a deposit 
substitutes for currency depends on the solvency of the IDI. The FDIC safeguards the nation’s 
depositors by pledging to pay out all insured deposits in the event that the private depository is 
met with illiquidity or insolvency. 
Depository institutions pay premiums into a deposit insurance fund which is used by 
FDIC to pay for any losses caused by an insolvent bank. Most of these losses are the insured 
deposits held by a failed bank, as well as any administrative costs of liquidating its assets to 
settle its liabilities. As a result, defining which deposits qualify for insurance is of prime 
importance for the FDIC’s operations and fiscal health. 
One contentious category of deposit covered by the FDIC is the brokered deposit. In 
19842, the FDIC moved to eliminate “pass-through” insurance coverage for brokered deposits, 
i.e., insurance coverage on qualified fiduciary or custodial accounts. This rule was later thrown 
out by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit3 as it did not 
comply with the statutory deposit insurance mandate, and has since been debated (pp. 175, 291, 
435, and passim).4 Despite the nature of these deposits, insurance coverage of brokered deposits 
by the FDIC persists. As a compromise, in 1989 Congress passed the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),5 in part to prohibit IDIs that failed to meet 
capital requirements from accepting brokered deposits (p. 412).6 Today the FDIC insures both 
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those deposits held by the banking system deemed to be “core” and also those that are brokered 
(provided that appropriate capital levels are maintained).7  
Section 1506 of the Dodd-Frank Act8 of 2010 required that a study be commissioned on 
core deposits and brokered accounts. For the purposes herein, there were two important goals of 
this study.9 First, Congress wanted to reassess the definition of a “core deposit” used for the 
purpose of calculating the insurance premium assigned by the FDIC.10 Second, a closer look at 
the relationship between core deposits and the larger US economy was warranted, particularly 
concerning any stabilizing effects that could accrue to the banking sector by redefining core 
deposits.11 
In this paper I look at the fundamental reason why deposit insurance exists, and to what 
extent different deposit accounts should be insured. I construct alternative criteria to gauge the 
appropriateness of a funding source’s coverage by the FDIC and conclude with some further 
policy changes that could reduce the costs of insurance and promote the stability of the banking 
sector, as well as the broader financial arena. 
 
WHY DEPOSIT INSURANCE? 
Congress established the FDIC in 1933 as a response to widespread bank failures during the 
Great Depression. In a bid to restore confidence in the financial system, the Federal government 
pledged to safeguard deposits through deposit insurance. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 
1933 (FDIA) requires the payment of deposit insurance “as soon as possible” to mitigate any 
disruption caused by a bank failure.12 These payments are enabled through the deposit insurance 
fund, backed by an emergency line of credit from the US Treasury if necessary. To date, no 
depositor has ever lost a penny of insured deposits in the FDIC’s history, and payouts to insured 
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depositors generally occur within one business day (p. 11604).13 
Today´s modern banking landscape is shaped by fractional-reserve banks. Acting as 
depository institutions these banks are obliged to pay out a sum of deposit liabilities on demand 
but hold only a fraction of the necessary funds as highly liquid assets (i.e., reserves) to meet 
these momentary demands. One unfortunate side effect of a fractional-reserve banking system is 
the omnipresent possibility of bank illiquidity owing to the disconnect between the sum and 
maturity of its liabilities versus its assets.14 A bank takes on deposits that are payable on demand 
while financing these liabilities with assets (typically loans) of longer maturity. Using short-term 
deposits to fund longer-term investment projects leaves a bank open to the risk that new funding 
will not be renewed (or rolled over), thus rendering it illiquid. A bank will not generally be 
exposed to the illiquidity that the maturity mismatch generates so long as withdrawals are largely 
uncorrelated. Given the law of large numbers, on any given day only a small percentage of total 
depositors demand their funds. There remains a possibility, however, that a sufficient number of 
depositors will claim their funds simultaneously and, as a result, the bank will become illiquid. 
The mix of illiquid assets with liquid liabilities can give rise to runs by depositors fearful of 
suffering a loss on their deposited funds. This incentive holds regardless of the actual financial 
position of the bank, as any fractional-reserve bank will be exposed to illiquidity and cannot 
perfectly predict when and to what extent depositors will make withdrawals.15 
The FDIC provides deposit insurance to make insured depositors whole and hence 
mitigate the possibility of a bank run. By guaranteeing a deposit to a sufficient amount, the FDIC 
has not eliminated the possibility of a bank run but has greatly reduced the likelihood because no 
depositor need worry that his funds will not be paid back on demand and at par value.16 
While deposit insurance reduces the apparent problem of depositors withdrawing their 
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funds en masse, it creates the secondary problem of moral.17 Removing the threat of losses 
diminishes the incentive for a depositor to monitor the financial position of his bank. (Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the first states in the United States to experiment with mandated deposit-
insurance plans were also those with poorly capitalized, state-chartered banks.18) In response, the 
FDIC also undertakes a supervisory, regulatory and enforcement role in the financial system to 
minimize potential payouts. It does so through two avenues, one active and the other passive. 
The FDIC actively monitors the risk-based capital ratios of insured banks, as do the other 
regulators of IDIs, i.e., the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency. When a bank’s capital ratio falls below 8 percent, it is given a warning. A drop below 6 
percent can result in prompt corrective measures being triggered, that may result in, e.g., a 
mandated change of management or other corrective action. Finally, when an IDI’s capital ratio 
falls below 2 percent, it is termed “critically undercapitalized,” the institution is closed, and the 
FDIC is appointed as the receiver of the bank. In this role the FDIC must resolve the failed 
institution and pay out the guaranteed amount to insured depositors.19 
The FDIC also passively limits the activities by IDIs by restricting the types and amounts 
of liabilities that it will guarantee. By mostly limiting insurance to “core deposits,” it leaves large 
depositors and holders of noncore deposits exposed to potential losses. This exposure creates an 
incentive for these depositors (and lenders) to monitor a bank’s investment portfolio, and to 
allocate funds to only those banks deemed sufficiently strong to make good on their liabilities. It 
is critically important that the FDIC accurately define which bank liabilities constitute core 
deposits, an ongoing process debated more on the merits of which insurance policies can 
stabilize deposits as opposed to searching for those deposits which require insurance coverage 
because of either the fractional-reserve nature of banking, or the risky practice of maturity 
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mismatching with deposits. For many types of deposits, a sufficient amount of insurance must be 
included to reduce the incentive for a bank run, but guaranteeing too many noncore deposits will 
reduce the incentive for depositors to aid in the monitoring of depository institutions which 
results in an unnecessary increase in moral hazard. 
 
WHAT ARE CORE DEPOSITS? 
In the normal course of business, even as some bank customers add to or withdraw from their 
accounts, a significant part of the money on deposit remains untouched. These stable deposits 
represent “core deposits,” which banks use to fund their lending operations. Core deposits are 
defined through convention in the Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) (p. 4).20 As such, 
core deposits typically include demand deposits, negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW), 
automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts, money-market demand accounts (MMDAs), and most 
savings and time deposits under $250,000.21 
From the fractional-reserve bank’s perspective, core deposits represent a mostly stable 
funding base due to the fact that they are less interest-rate sensitive than other assets (p. 5).22 The 
key problem facing such a bank is balancing the maturity mismatch between its on-demand 
liabilities and its longer-dated assets. Since core deposits show little fluctuation in their 
redemption demands, they provide the bank with predictable “costs,” as well as a measure of 
customer loyalty. Core deposits, thus, provide an element of stability to the otherwise potentially 
destabilizing activity of maturity transformation. 
Because of the importance of the deposits for both depositors and banks, the FDIC 
insures all accounts that are categorized as core deposits. Doing so removes the incentive for 
depositors to monitor the financial positions of their banks, however, and can potentially breed 
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destabilizing forces. To mitigate these destabilizing forces, as well as to limit the amount of 
potential payouts it is obliged to make, the FDIC has guaranteed, since its inception, deposits 
only up to a finite amount, as shown in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: FDIC Insurable Limit per Bank and Average Insured Deposit per Worker23 
 
 
The insurable limit has always ranged somewhere between 300 and 900 percent GDP per capita. 
(The lowest insurable limit was 377% of GDP per capita in 1966; the highest occurred in 1935 at 
870% of GDP per capita.) The onset of the crisis in 2008 ended the longest continuous period 
that FDIC deposit insurance had undergone in the United States without an increase in the 
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insurable limit. The insurable limit per bank has also always exceeded the average insured 
deposit per capita. As of year-end 2012, the maximum insurable limit was $250,000 while the 
average working age American held only $41,312 in insurable deposits. Clearly only a very few 
Americans are able to make use of the insurable limit that FDIC provides.  
The comparison between how much insurance the FDIC provides and the needs of the 
average working-age individual is better matched when adjusted for price inflation, as in figure 
2, but still shows a similar disconnect. 
 
 




The inflation-adjusted size of the average deposit per working-age American has changed little 
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over the past 50 years. Expressed in terms of 2008 dollars, the range has varied between a low of 
$19,442 in 1959 to a high more recently of $38,730 in 2012. The 150 percent increase in the 
nominal insurable limit in 2008 to $250,000 was a large increase in nominal terms, though the 
resulting maximum insurance limit was still less, in inflation-adjusted terms, than in 1980. Since 
the FDIC’s inception in 1934, the nominal insurable limit has increased a hundredfold, which 
represents a 600 percent increase when adjusted for inflation. 
One fact stands out when looking at the evolution of insurable limits over time, both in 
nominal and inflation-adjusted terms: in both cases, the FDIC today provides deposit coverage 
far in excess of its original level of coverage. Furthermore, this is not a new phenomenon. This 
has been the case since clear data on insured funds began in1959. 
 
BROKERED DEPOSITS 
Those funds the FDIC labels as core deposits mostly coincide with the scope of insured accounts. 
In one significant exception, the FDIC has traditionally extended insurance to a deposit base that 
does not meet its own definition of core deposits: brokered deposits. 
Brokered deposits arise when a third party places a client’s money on demand or in short-
term loans. A common example of such a transaction would be where several individuals deposit 
a small sum of money with their broker. The broker in turn compiles these small deposits into 
one large-denomination deposit which is then invested or deposited into an investment vehicle. 
The economies of scale available through this practice enable small depositors to earn higher 
interest rates on their deposits than would otherwise be feasible, and as a consequence the 
practice also opens a new funding source to banks from depositors attracted to these higher 
returns. Under current FDIC rules, only well-capitalized banks (i.e., those with a capital ratio 
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above 10 percent) are allowed to solicit or accept brokered deposits. Banks that do accept these 
funds have access to an alternative pool of funding, as well as a reduction in handling costs by 
reducing the number of depositors for a given amount of deposits. Together with core deposits, 
brokered deposits comprise a bank’s deposit base. 
While brokered deposits may augment a bank’s liquidity position, they represent a 
tenuous funding source. As these deposits are generally more interest-rate sensitive than generic 
deposits, their stability (in terms of both turnover and likelihood of remaining deposited with a 
bank) can be unstable. The FDIC has acknowledged these problematic aspects of brokered 
deposits, but it has created only a partial solution. Since the FDIC views a blanket prohibition on 
the use of brokered deposits as unduly restrictive, it has reached a compromise by insuring 
brokered deposits up to a limit of $250,000 per broker per bank (pp. 3-4).25 One effect of this 
limit is to temper the amount of deposit brokering any one broker can intermediate. As a result of 
this, a bank accepting a brokered loan is not overly exposed by sudden withdrawals instigated by 
the broker (either directly through the broker moving his depositors’ funds to a different bank or 
indirectly through depositors withdrawing their money due to a loss of trust in their broker). By 
the end of Q1 2011, $562.3 billion of brokered deposits provided funding to the banking system 
(table 2). Of these, almost 85 percent ($477 billion) are insured by the FDIC. 
 
Table 1. Brokered Deposits Held by IDIs (as of March 31, 2011)26 
Size of bank Number of banks 
Total brokered 
deposits ($ bn.) 
Share of domestic 
deposits (%) 
Under $1bn. 6,904 47.1 14.9 
$1–$10 bn. 563 104.7 13.7 
$10–$50 bn. 71 122.7 12.0 
Over $50 bn. 36 287.8 59.4 
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Fewer than half of all FDIC-insured banks report holding brokered deposits, and these 
brokered accounts are concentrated in the largest banks in the country—those with assets greater 
than $50 billion. Thus, the main beneficiaries of insured brokered accounts are the country’s 
largest banks. These banks have the most diversified deposit base and are thus the least in need 
of deposit insurance. 
Because the beneficiary banks of these brokered deposits are also the country’s largest 
banks, there is the ever-present danger that the “too big to fail” issue will lead to less-prudent 
asset management than would otherwise be the case. Brokered deposits are an attractive but also 
tenuous and potentially unstable funding source. While insurance grants benefits to banks when 
deposits are concentrated and susceptible to correlated withdrawals, brokered deposits can span 
geographic, industry, and demographic divides. This results in significantly less correlation 
between the redemption demands of their deposits. Consequently, banks taking brokered deposits 
are less in need of insurance to remove the incentives for depositors to withdraw funding in light 
of the expectation that other depositors will also do so. 
At the same time, the typical depositor in a brokered fund is wealthier than the standard 
holder of a conventional deposit. Due to their status as a form of investment, brokered deposits 
are usually funded by individuals already meeting their demand to hold a cash balance through 
another deposit. In this way, insurance on brokered deposits is regressive, because the benefits 
accrue primarily to wealthier investors at the expense of more common deposit holders. This 
benefit is a subset of the larger wealth transfers inherent in deposit insurance. Well-run banks 
will be overcharged for their deposit insurance because of this one-size-fits-all policy, while 
poorly run banks will be undercharged.27 
Insuring brokered deposits gives a benefit to the bank holding them because the insurance 
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provides an unnecessary guarantee to depositors. On the one hand, these deposits are not 
primarily undertaken as an uncertainty hedge, as is the case with other deposits. Brokered 
deposits instead represent a demand to remain liquid while still participating in a potentially 
lucrative investment. In distinction, core deposits are not undertaken with the primary goal of 
earning the depositor profit but instead with the goal of providing a safety blanket should an 
unforeseen event arise. On the other hand, there is no significant naïveté concerning the potential 
risks involved with brokered funds on the side of depositors. While they may not personally 
understand the risks involved in a fractional-reserve deposit account, their brokerage surely does. 
Since all brokered funds go through, by definition, a financial intermediary (i.e., the broker), 
depositors are in effect outsourcing the understanding of how the deposit-taking side of the 
financial system functions. Therefore, there is no significant knowledge gap that must be 
protected via deposit insurance. 
Deposit insurance exists to provide a safe deposit vehicle for unsophisticated savers and 
to stabilize depositories against runs.28 In the case of brokered deposits the first criterion is not 
relevant – brokers provide the level of sophistication necessary to understand the relevant risks, 
in addition to the fact that wealthier and more financially savvy individuals are typically the 
demographic using a brokered deposit. The second criterion is also not relevant to the extent that 
brokered deposits are potentially destabilizing as a funding source. Extending deposit insurance 
to them motivates banks to hold a higher share of their core deposits as brokered funds than 
would otherwise be the case, and thus expose the FDIC to potential payout losses as a result. 
As the FDIC subsidizes both brokerages and banks accepting brokered deposits through 
its insurance, we may expect such deposits to be accepted by banks in excess of what is prudent. 
The risks of banking instability are increased as a consequence, as brokerages entice their clients 
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to partake in this guaranteed “investment”, causing bank funding to shift to this relatively lower-
cost (though less stable) funding source. Indeed, banks that have failed since 2008 have relied 
more heavily on brokered deposits than on their conventional core-deposit base (p. 36).29 The 
rationale is simple—large quantities of brokered deposits can be collected, in part due to the 
higher interest rate banks can offer depositors (by investing the proceeds in riskier assets coupled 
with decreased management costs), and depositors have little incentive to assess the broker or the 
bank’s stability because the funds are FDIC insured. While these problems also exist to various 
degrees with core deposits, the economies of scale offered by brokered deposits and their 
tenuousness as a funding source breed instabilities. Brokered deposits are relied on for quick 
liquidity, but they can also reverse quickly, leading to a liquidity crisis that drains deposit-
insurance reserves. 
 
WHAT QUALIFIES A DEPOSIT FOR INSURANCE? 
Given that brokered deposits do not appear to satisfy either of the goals of deposit insurance, it is 
instructive to reassess them in light of the actual criteria used by the FDIC to evaluate whether a 
deposit is core. In this regard the FDIC has five characteristics that are useful in evaluating 
whether a source of bank funding is a core deposit and consequently whether it qualifies for 
insurance (pp. 49-52).30 These criteria are important, as they determine the relevant trade-off 
between the amount of deposits insured by the FDIC and the degree of residual monitoring 
activity by uninsured depositors. 
 
1. Interest rates. IDIs that offer higher interest rates on core deposits are generally riskier (p. 
49).31 It is for this reason that under FDIC regulations any IDI that is not well-capitalized 
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can offer no more than the “national” rate plus 75 basis points on deposits of similar size 
and maturity.32  If interest rates are high relative to the industry, a bank may be taking on 
undue risks and require sanctions by the FDIC or removal of deposit insurance coverage 
from its products.  
2. Whether deposits can be gathered quickly in large amounts. Deposits that can be gathered 
quickly, as is the case with Internet-based and high-interest-rate products, are unstable in 
the sense that they can also leave the bank quickly. Although the FDIC makes no 
distinction in the manner that funds are obtained when assigning insurance, recent 
comments indicate a hesitation in extending insurance to products that can be gathered 
quickly and in bulk (p. 50).33  
3. Customer relationship. Deposits received based on a customer relationship are more 
stable than those that do not go through this time-consuming exercise. Although there are 
difficulties in identifying what qualifies as an adequate client-banker relationship (e.g., 
does “relationship” refer to the duration of association, or the depth?), the FDIC generally 
views a deposit based on a customer-banker relationship to be more stable than one 
obtained through a third-party (pp. 50-51).34   
4. Liquidity. Uninsured deposits have the ability to exacerbate liquidity problems in a weak 
bank because frightened depositors may shift their uninsured deposits to more stable 
accounts. The corollary holds true as well. Highly liquid assets that can be easily drained 
from a bank are good candidates for insurance to remove the incentives that could lead to 
en masse redemptions. 
5. Time to maturity. A deposit with a low time to maturity (or few restrictions on early 
withdrawal for a time deposit), has an increased probability that depositors will withdraw 
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it from a weak institution. Financial products with shorter maturities (or those closer to 
maturity) are more easily redeemed, and as such they can benefit from insurance to 
remove the incentive individuals have to withdraw them too quickly from their bank. 
 
Setting criteria for deposit insurance coverage is crucial to safeguarding core assets, 
which are systemically important to the bank’s liquidity position, while not creating a sense of 
complacency. Since the defining characteristics of a currency substitute are that it is redeemable 
on demand and at par value,35 any criterion addressing these issues would shed light on the 
demand by depositors for insurance. (This includes criteria 4 and 5, as well as criterion 1 to the 
extent that deposits do not necessarily represent an interest-bearing transaction). 
The FDIC must consider the trade-off between the amount of deposits to insure and the 
increased monitoring activities it will need to undertake to replace those depositors unconcerned 
with their bank’s liquidity. The FDIC chooses the insurable limit in making this decision (while 
implicitly assuming that larger deposit holders are more financially literate and understand the 
risks involved), but an alternative metric would be a direct assessment of the depositor’s 
knowledge of the undertaking. While no easy measure exists to gauge depositor knowledge 
directly, certain accounts that are channeled through a financial intermediary (such as an 
investment advisor or deposit broker) signal a greater knowledge of the risks involved.36 As such, 
a deposit made in such circumstances would not require insurance, or at least would not 
necessarily fall prey to the self-fulfilling panic described by Diamond and Dybvig.37 None of the 
FDIC’s current criteria measure for depositor financial literacy, but by focusing on the client-
banker relationship, criterion 3 comes close to the extent that bankers are presumed to be more 
financially literate than the average depositor and a closer relationship signals a sharing of this 
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literacy. 
To set criteria from the opposite side of the transaction, one would need to look to the 
determinants of how stable and important the deposit is to the financial stability of the bank. 
Criteria 1, 2, 4, and 5 all measure how stable the deposit is within the corpus of the bank’s assets, 
and as such help to determine how important it is that they be insured. 
However, some of the criteria to assess whether a source of funding qualifies for deposit 
insurance are less reliable. Relying on the method that procures funding, as in criterion 2, 
obfuscates the issue of whether the funding is stable by instead focusing on how quickly it can be 
gathered or shed (it answers the question “is this deposit in need of stability?” instead of the 
more relevant “is this deposit stable?”). Criterion 3 begs the question by claiming, paradoxically, 
that insured deposits are stable, but also that they consequently require insurance to maintain 
their stability. Whether a funding source is a candidate for insurance should depend on its 
stability as a stand-alone uninsured deposit, not whether it would be more stable if insured (as it 
almost assuredly will). 
While determining what deposits should be insured poses no significant theoretical 
problem, practical issues plague the actual decision. If deposit insurance did not result in moral 
hazard, for example, there would be no significant cost to insuring a deposit, save for 
administering the insurance fund. Banks would not partake in riskier behavior under the 
perceived backstop that insurance provides, and thus their probability of illiquidity or insolvency 
would not be altered. To the extent that depositors would lose the incentive to make a run on 
their bank, the deposit fund would be drawn in a reduced number of cases due to reasons, mostly 
exogenous to the banking sector (e.g., natural disasters, wars, or famines which cause a spike in 
the redemption demands of depositors).  
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Since moral hazard does exist, and can only be imperfectly tempered through regulatory 
solutions, the FDIC must rely on depositor monitoring to operate effectively.38 Whether this 
monitoring comes directly, e.g., from depositors selecting better-capitalized banks, or indirectly, 
e.g., from banks maintaining well-capitalized positions based on reputational concerns, is of little 
import. A relevant concern for any deposit-insurance plan is identifying those depositors most at 
risk and those deposits most systematically important to a well-functioning financial system. 
 
CORE DEPOSITS AND BANKING STABILITY 
The amount of core deposits held in a bank is closely related to its probability of default. 
Banking failures are associated with higher levels of brokered deposits (p. 5),39 and firms more 
dependent on them have lower post-insolvency resolution values.40 Neither of these points is new 
or surprising to the FDIC – as far back as 1983 Congress discussed policies to counter these 
negative effects, the result of which was the Demand Deposit Equity Act of 1983 (see especially 
pg. 322 for discussion pertaining to bank failures and post-insolvency resolution). Two points 
bear mentioning in this regard: (1) when brokered deposits are substituted for core deposits, 
banks face an elevated default probability (p. 36),41 and (2) a greater percentage of deposits held 
as core deposits (i.e., substituting core for brokered deposits) reduces the loss to FDIC in the 
event  of failure (p. 38).42 This first point is well-known as the failure of many thrift institutions 
in the 1980s is commonly cited as caused by an over-reliance on brokered deposits.43 A shift in 
funding from core to brokered deposits increases bank instability and, with it, raises FDIC 
resolution costs for these failed institutions. 
Indeed, the FDIC has recognized the instability that insured brokered deposits produce 
(app. 8).44 In particular, it notes four aspects of the problem: (1) brokered deposits allow banks to 
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attract large volumes of funds from outside their natural market area, irrespective of their 
knowledge of these new markets; (2) insurance provided to brokered funds eliminates the need 
for depositors to analyze the viability and sustainability of the underlying financial institution; 
(3) reduced market discipline results, because a link is severed between the providers of funds 
and their end users; (4) insured funds allow for poorly managed and illiquid institutions to 
function longer than market forces would generally dictate, thus increasing FDIC resolution 
costs. 
Insuring deposits allows for greater ease of substitution between currency and deposit 
accounts. Because insurance stabilizes the demand for deposits, banks benefit through greater 
ease in planning their lending operations (pp. 36-37).45 The cost of providing the benefit of 
security to depositors and simplified planning to depositories is a reduction in private-sector 
monitoring of liquidity and solvency, as well as the potential costs of resolving failed institutions. 
In continuing to insure brokered deposits, the FDIC not only opens itself up to larger potential 
losses through insurance claims, but it also promotes banking-sector instability through 
decreased depositor discipline. 
The Independent Community Bankers of America (p. 2)46 notes that due to the broad 
definition assigned to brokered deposits, depositors utilize local, community banking services 
less as brokers shift their funds to larger markets. Clients can deposit their money at arm’s length 
(i.e., without first establishing a relationship with their bank or broker) through brokered 
accounts, while lacking knowledge of how their deposits will be spent. This severs the depositor-
banker relationship, which the FDIC recognizes is important in building a stable funding base.47 
While attractive to depositors, this increases potential losses on the FDIC through insurance 
claims, and it also increases the pressure on local banks to find a deposit base to service the 
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needs of their communities. The standard deposit base that local depositors would have provided 
is instead brokered into what is more akin to an investment than a standard deposit. Insurance 
extended to brokered loans gives these depositors undue risk-adjusted returns, while 
simultaneously placing increased pressures on local banks to secure funding. 
The American Bankers Association (p. 1)48 holds that the FDIC should avoid classifying 
deposits based on the channel through which they are obtained and should instead focus on the 
specific characteristics of the deposit. This would require a rewriting of the criteria the FDIC 
uses to assign insurance to a financial product. It would have the benefit of focusing attention on 
the question of why certain financial products should be insured instead of on the proximal 
results of such insurance. 
In looking for new classification criteria to use in determining which deposits should be 
insured, the FDIC should take a closer look at some of its own conclusions from its recent 
assessment of core and brokered-deposit funding.49 While most of the FDIC’s response to 
section 1506 of the Dodd-Frank Act has been to more effectively monitor the core deposits of the 
banking sector, an alternative exists. By limiting its deposit coverage of some financial products, 
the FDIC can garner the aid of private investors in monitoring bank stability. Such private-sector 
monitoring is notably absent in today’s environment, where high coverage limits on a wide range 
of financial products remove the incentive for private agents to take an interest in their bank’s 
stability. In particular, removing FDIC insurance coverage from brokered accounts would solve 
five problems: 
 
1. Brokered deposits represent a riskier use of money than a standard deposit in another type 
of insured account (p. 68).50 Depositors are not concerned primarily with the safe return 
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of their funds (as is the case with demand deposits) but rather with seeking a higher risk-
return trade-off (p. 17).51 To the extent that the FDIC removes the risk of the deposit, the 
depositors will seek the highest returns possible. For the bank accepting brokered 
deposits, this implies a search for the highest-yielding investments, which are typically 
associated with elevated risk levels. 
2. Because depositors in brokered accounts seek greater returns, holding them accountable 
for losses would avoid promoting risky investment activity. Spreading the costs of FDIC 
insurance among all depositors (and potentially taxpayers) reduces the accountability of 
these original depositors to their losses. It also skews the risk-return trade-off by reducing 
(or eliminating) risk while not compromising the expected return.52 
3. Removing insurance from brokered accounts would hold brokers accountable to their 
clients in reporting the real risk of investing in riskier activities. Brokered deposits might 
still be an attractive option due to the increased return they can potentially offer, but the 
risk-reduction provided through insurance would be removed. Deposit insurance 
guarantees that the original deposit will be repaid, so at present there is no threat of the 
loss of principle to the depositor. As a result, the depositor’s emphasis may be placed 
solely on maximizing gains instead of on balancing that goal with minimizing losses. As 
of Q3 2013, 80.07% of all brokered deposits (almost $600 billion) were eligible for 
insurance.53 Removing insurance from brokered deposits would have the effect of putting 
these funds on a level playing field with the other $150 billion of uninsured brokered 
deposits (these represent brokered deposits made above the insurable limit). Since 20% of 
the brokered market can currently compete without insurance there is evidence that the 
remaining 80% could also do so.  
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4. Removing insurance from brokered deposits will still allow banks to utilize them as a 
funding source, as is currently the case with the $150 billion of uninsured brokered 
deposits. The only difference will be that to obtain funding through this channel, banks, 
brokers, and depositors will have to be accountable for potential losses. Thus, no funding 
options are removed from the banks’ existing scopes of operations, as long as the risk 
profiles can be justified relative to other investments. 
5. The FDIC already recognizes that brokered deposits are not stable enough to be included 
in the calculation of core deposits and contribute to increased probability of bank 
insolvency and higher resolution costs to the FDIC (app. B).54 In part the reliance of 
banks on brokered deposits comes from the belief among depositors that they offer 
superior risk-return profiles compared with more conventional investment funds. Without 
insurance on brokered deposits, depositors could not earn the higher rates of return that 
accompany them and would have to contend with either smaller deposits at a lower 
interest rate which better reflects their demand to hold a cash balance, or personally take 
on more risk by pursuing an uninsured deposit or investment. The role of the FDIC is to 
secure those deposits that provide a substitute for holding currency, not to mitigate 
investment risk. Eliminating insurance on brokered deposits would entice investors to 
hold their cash requirements in core deposits, thus strengthening banks’ balance sheets. 
Alternatively, removing insurance may encourage individuals to move their deposits into 
more conventional investments, thus removing the illusion of stable funding from the 
banking system. Instead of investing directly in equity or debt markets, brokered 
depositors currently turn to the banking sector to make their investment decisions. One 
unfortunate result is an unwarranted emphasis on debt financing as banks loan out these 
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deposits in their roles as financial intermediaries. Without the advantageous risk-adjusted 




An adequate core-deposit base is necessary to promote bank stability. Insurance is extended to 
core deposits to ensure this stability by reducing the threat of a bank run. Insurance is also 
traditionally extended to brokered deposits. Unfortunately, the continued role of the FDIC in 
insuring brokered deposits removes market discipline and increases instability at the taxpayers’ 
expense. Insuring these deposits may also harm the competitiveness of the banking industry to 
the extent that large banks are the primary receivers of brokered deposits and thus the 
beneficiaries of the safety blanket that extending deposit insurance to these funds provides. If the 
FDIC were to cease insuring brokered deposits, banks would have to rely on a stable deposit 
base to finance their lending activities. 
Deposit insurance reform is contentious, in part because of the overlapping regulatory 
frameworks that govern its provision and the conflict these bring to a strict economic analysis. It 
is an unfortunate side effect of this that changes to the regulatory structure of banking, and 
deposit insurance in particular, only appears when banking crises threaten the stability of the 
larger financial arena.55 The recent recession provides one such opportunity to reassess whether 
all deposits are created equally, and therefore are all equally good candidates for insurance 
coverage.  
The reliance on brokered deposits ebbs and flows counter-cyclically. In 2007, just before 
the recession commenced, brokered deposits were a relatively unattractive option for depositors 
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and accounted for approximately 6.25% of total deposits. As the crisis intensified the rush to 
insured safety ensued with brokered deposits increasing to 8.65% of total deposits by Q1 2009. 
Note that this does not represent a rush to safety in the sense that depositors were fearful that 
their principal would be lost, but rather a rush for the higher risk-adjusted returns made possible 
by placing money in an insured brokered deposit earning a greater nominal return than a standard 
deposit. As of Q3 2013 brokered deposits accounted for 6.71% of all deposits, a figure which has 
steadily increased since late 2011. This rise can be attributed to depositors seeking higher returns 
in the prolonged low-interest rate environment on standard deposit accounts. This increase also 
exposes the FDIC to increased risk as depositors capitalize on the attractive risk-return profile 
that brokered deposits provide and which might not be possible if one was directly exposed to 
the risk of illiquidity or insolvency. 
The Great Recession of 2008 demonstrated that the quality of the banking sector’s assets 
is subject to sudden reversals. This creates regulatory problems when relying on assets to assess 
a bank´s stability. One alternative is to focus on banking-sector liabilities. From the banking 
sector’s standpoint, these liabilities—whether deposits on demand or short-term loans—are 
problematic because banks become illiquid and eventually insolvent if too many depositors 
redeem them simultaneously. Brokered deposits in particular represent a troublesome area 
because they fulfill none of the criteria that the FDIC has established as necessary for a funding 
source to qualify for insurance. Notably, such a conclusion runs counter to the Demand Deposit 
Equity Act of 1983.56  
The FDIC can streamline its operations and promote a more stable financial sector by 
correctly identifying which funds should qualify for insurance. Insuring only those deposits 
identified as being both germane to a bank’s maturity mismatch and deposited by an individual 
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with the motive of having on-demand availability would hold banks accountable for the full costs 
of offering risky “deposit-like” products, while simultaneously removing the subsidized gains to 
depositors holding these “deposit-like” accounts. To the extent that brokered deposits appear 
similar to core deposits yet lack the same uncertainty-hedging motive, removing them from the 




I would like to thank the Mercatus Center at George Mason University for support while writing 
this paper, and two anonymous referees for insightful comments. All remaining errors are my 
own.  
 
REFERENCES AND NOTES 
                                                 
1
 12 U.S.C. section 1828(a)(1)(B) 
2
 See 49 Fed. Reg. 13003 (April 2, 1984) (effective on 1 October 1984). 
3
 See FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
4
 Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. 1985. Impact of brokered deposits on banks and thrifts : risks 
versus benefits, (hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session), July 16. 
5
 Pub.L. 101–73, 103 Stat. 183. 
6
 X12 C.F.R. § 337.6. cf. Dreyfus, J., A. Saunders and L. Allan (1994) Deposit Insurance and Regulatory 
Forbearance: Are Caps on Insured Deposits Optimal? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26(3), part 1: 412-38. 
7
 The capital measure terms are defined in the following regulations: FDIC—12 C.F.R. part 325 , subpart B; Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System—12 C.F.R. part 208 ; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—12 
C.F.R. part 6 ; Office of Thrift Supervision—12 C.F.R. part 565 . 
8
 Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173 
9
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (2011) Study on Core Deposits and Brokered Deposits. 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/coredeposit-study.pdf. 
10
 Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173, sec. 1506(a)(1) 
11
 Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173, sec. 1506(a)(4) 
12
 See FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 5 1821(f). 
13




 Note that this problem is not apparent in full-reserve banking systems, as advocated in Huerta de Soto (2006: 
chap. 9) and Bagus and Howden (2013; forthcoming). Kotlikoff (2010) provides a similar proposal by advocating 
that a full-reserve be held in the form of highly liquid debt securities, such as government bonds. See Huerta de 
Soto, J. (2006) Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles, trans. M. A. Stroup (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises 
Institute); Bagus, P, and D. Howden (2013) Some Ethical Dilemmas with Modern Banking. Business Ethics: A 
 
  25
                                                                                                                                                             
European Review 22(3): 235-45; Bagus, P., and D. Howden (forthcoming) The Economic and Legal Significance of 
‘Full’ Deposit Availability. European Journal of Law and Economics; Kotlikoff, L. J. (2010) Jimmy Stewart is Dead: 
Ending the World’s Ongoing Financial Plague with Limited Purpose Banking. New York: Wiley. 
15
 Diamond, D. W., and P. H. Dybvig, (1983) Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, Journal of Political 
Economy 91(3): 401–19. 
16
 Historical alternatives to dealing with the common bank run without insurance exist—including the suspension of 
convertibility of deposited funds, clearinghouse loans to finance short-term illiquidity and banks cross-guaranteeing 
each others’ deposit bases. See Selgin and White (1997), Timberlake (1984), Calomiris (1989), Hartley (2001). See : 
Selgin, G., and L. H. White (1997) The Option Clause in Scottish Banking, Journal of Money, Banking and Credit 
29(2): 270–73. Timberlake Jr., R. H. (1984) The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 16(1): 1–15. Calomiris, C. W.  (1989) Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Record, 
Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 13 (May–June): 10–30. Hartley, J. E. (2001) Mutual 
Deposit Insurance: Other Lessons from the Record. Independent Review 6(2) (2001): 235–52. 
17
 While the literature more commonly focuses on increased risk taking by bankers as the consequence of the moral 
hazard of deposit insurance, Ely (1999) looks at “regulatory moral hazard.” Any deposit-insurance fee will be paid 
by solvent banks, which are also not able to easily avoid paying such fees. As a consequence, regulatory diligence 
will have a tendency to decrease, because it will always be paid by surviving banks, which effectively cover losses 
from bank insolvencies caused by lax regulatory policies. Ely, B. (1999) Regulatory Moral Hazard: The Real Moral 
Hazard in Federal Deposit Insurance,” Independent Review 4(2): 241–54. See also Bhattacharya, S., A. W. A. Boot, 
and A. V. Thakor (1998) The Economics of Bank Regulation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30(4): 745–70, 
and Thies, C. F., and D. A. Gerlowski (1989) Deposit Insurance: A History of Failure, Cato Journal 8(3): 677–93. 
18
 Economides, N., R. G. Hubbard, and D. Palia (1999) Federal Deposit Insurance: Economic Efficiency or 
Politics?,” Regulation 22(3): 15–17. 
19
 It is questionable how effective the FDIC is in distinguishing between bank illiquidity and insolvency. Kaufman 
(1999) finds that over 90 percent of emergency lending during the US S&L crisis in the 1980s went to institutions 
that subsequently failed. See: Kaufman, G. G. (1999) Do Lender of Last Resort Operations Require Bank 
Regulation?” (paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute conference, Is Banking Regulation Necessary?, 




 While essentially identical to the common demand deposit, the NOW account is a remnant of Regulation Q. 
Active until July 2011, Regulation Q mandated that interest could not be paid on demand deposits. NOW accounts 
were structured to comply with Regulation Q while still providing an interest-bearing deposit account. Regulation Q 
once allowed for an “artificially sharp distinction between no-yield money and no-check savings,” which in turn 
allowed the Federal Reserve more defined control over the money supply. (Garrison 2009: 190). This sharp 
distinction was no longer necessary as monetary policy moved from money-supply targeting to interest-rate 
targeting under the Volcker Fed. See: Garrison, R. W. (2009) Interest-Rate Targeting During the Great Moderation: 




 Source: FDIC9. Worker is here defined by someone between 15-64 years of age. 
24
 Source: FDIC9. These figures are adjusted for CPI measured inflation, using 2008 as the base year.  
25





















 Huerta de Soto.14  See also: Bagus, P., and D. Howden (2009) The Legitimacy of Loan Maturity Mismatching: A 
Risky, But Not Fraudulent, Undertaking, Journal of Business Ethics 90(3): 399–406. 
 
  26
                                                                                                                                                             
36
 It could be that deposit brokers are only more capable at seeking out higher interest rate products than common 
depositors are, in which case there would be no gain in financial knowledge by using a broker. At the same time, 
most brokers, financial planners and investment advisors must go through an accreditation process to obtain their 
license which involves readings or classes pertaining to the functioning of financial markets and the risks involved 
in specific products. 
37
 Diamond and Dybvig15 
38
 As an example of imperfect regulatory solutions on deposits, many financial products now offered by banks are 
direct responses to bypassing remnant legislations, e.g., sweep accounts to avoid reserve requirements or NOW and 
ATS accounts to avoid Regulation Q. 
39
 Government Accountability Office (2013) Financial Institutions: Causes and Consequences of Recent Community 
Bank Failures, (testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 13), 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=703ee6fe-c8cb-4c7f-a5f1-
773f2ab117b8    
40
 Bennett, R. L., and H. Unal (2011) The Cost Effectiveness of the Private Sector Organization of Failed Banks, 
(FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2009-11, FDIC Center for Financial Research, Arlington, 
VA), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2009/wp2009/CFR_WP_2009_11.pdf. Osterberg, William P., and J. 
B. Thomson (1995) Underlying Determinants of Closed-Bank Resolution Costs, in The Causes and Costs of 







 Barth, J. R., P. F. Bartholomew, and M. G. Bradley (1990) Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs, 
The Journal of Finance 45(3), Papers and Proceedings, Forty-ninth Annual Meeting, American Finance Association, 
Atlanta, Georgia, Dec. 28-30: 731-54. Cook, D. O., and L. J. Spellman (1994) Repudiation Risk and Restitution 







 Independent Community Bankers of America (2011) Letter from Independent Community Bankers of America to 
Sheila Bair, April 29, http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/cl042911.pdf  
47
 Berlin, M., and L. J. Mester (1999) Deposits and Relationship Lending, Review of Financial Studies 12(3): 579–
607. 
48





 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (1990) Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance. The Congress of the United 
States. 
51
 Holland, D. S. (1998) When Regulation Was Too Successful – the Sixth Decade of Deposit Insurance: A History 
of the Troubles of the U.S. Banking Industry in the 1980s and Early 1990s. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.   
52
 An alternative method to mitigate the moral hazard of insurance on brokered deposits is to increase the insurance 
premium banks must pay to offer the product, as in Otsuka Ayabe (1985-86). While this would, to some degree, 
lessen the existing level of moral hazard it does little to justify why insurance should be extended to this financial 
product at all. Similar arguments must take the Demand Deposit Equity Act of 1983 for granted, without reassessing 
whether all deposits are created equally and in equal need of insurance.  Otsuka Ayabe, G. (1985-86) The ´Brokered 
Deposit´ Regulation: A Response to the FDIC´s and FHLBB´s Efforts to Limit Deposit Insurance. UCLA Law 
Review 33(2): 594 - 641. 
53





 Redburn, F. S. (1988) Never Lost a Penny: An Assessment of Federal Deposit Insurance. Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 7(4): 687-702. 
56
 cf. Seward, G. C., and R. M. Zaitzeff  (1983-84) Insurability of Brokered Deposits: A Legislative Analysis. 
Business Lawyer 39(4): 1705-18. 
